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1127 
THE “FOUL” PROTECTION FOR A PHOTOGRAPHER’S 
ORIGINAL AND CREATIVE CHOICES IN A PHOTOGRAPH: 
EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF RENTMEESTER V. NIKE, 
INC. ON CREATIVITY IN PHOTOGRAPHY 
Olivia Lattanza* 
I.  INTRODUCTION   
The idea that “[p]hotographs are imbued with no less creativity, 
depth, and meaning than any other art form, and as such should be 
entitled to the full protection of copyright law” is an essential concept 
to consider when examining the scope of copyright protection for a 
photograph.1  In Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc.,2 the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s dismissal of a copyright infringement claim filed by 
Jacobus Rentmeester (“Rentmeester”) against Nike, Inc. (“Nike”), 
holding that Nike’s photograph was not substantially similar to 
Rentmeester’s photograph as a matter of law.3  The Ninth Circuit’s 
misguided application of copyright law in finding that the works were 
not substantially similar has serious implications for photographers’ 
development of creative works in the future.   
In 1984, Rentmeester photographed Michael Jordan (“Jordan”) 
for an issue of Life Magazine that highlighted athletes who would be 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2020; Boston College, B.A. 
in Psychology, minor in Music, 2017.  This Note was developed from a paper written for my 
Copyright Law class taught by Professor Rena Seplowitz.  I would like to thank Professor 
Seplowitz for igniting my interest in this area of law and for always providing invaluable 
guidance throughout all stages of the writing process.  I would also like to thank my family 
for their love and support in all aspects of my life. 
1  Brief for The American Society of Media Photographers, Inc. and The National Press 
Photographers Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Rentmeester v. 
Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-728) [hereinafter “Brief for Am. Soc’y of 
Media Photographers”]. 
2 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 1375 (2019). 
3 Id. at 1116, 1125. 
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competing in the Summer Olympic Games.4  The photograph featuring 
Jordan in “an artificial dunk pose inspired by ballet” is revered “by 
TIME Magazine as one of the most influential images of all time.”5  In 
addition to the unique ballet pose, Rentmeester largely orchestrated 
many of the elements of the photograph, including the camera position, 
strobe lights, and shutter speed.6  Subsequently, Rentmeester and Nike 
executed a licensing agreement that allowed Nike to use the color 
transparencies of his photograph.7  However, Nike violated this 
agreement when it hired its own photographer to shoot a photograph 
of Jordan that was “obviously inspired by Rentmeester’s” photograph.8  
Nike’s photograph captured many visually similar elements to the 
Rentmeester photograph, notably the leaping position towards the 
basketball hoop and the camera angle.9  Then, Rentmeester allowed 
Nike to use its photograph on billboards and posters for two more years 
for $15,000.10  In 2015, Rentmeester filed suit for copyright 
infringement because Nike continued to reproduce the photograph 
after the original two-year term expired.11   
The Ninth Circuit held that even though the two photographs 
are similar, the photographs are not substantially similar because 
Nike’s photograph displays distinct and creative photographic 
choices.12  Additionally, the court reasoned that there was no copyright 
infringement because Rentmeester cannot prevent other photographers 
from capturing the idea “of Jordan in a leaping, grand-jeté-inspired 
pose.”13  However, by holding that the photographs were not 
substantially similar, the Ninth Circuit split from various circuits in 
determining the scope of protection for a photograph.14  Compared to 
 
4 Id. at 1115.  This paragraph will only present a brief discussion of the facts.  For a detailed 
discussion of the background of this case, see Part IV.   
5 Steve Brachmann, Supreme Court Asked to Decide Copyrightable Elements of Iconic 
Michael Jordan Photograph, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 7, 2019), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/07/supreme-court-rentmeester-michael-jordan-
photograph/id=104650/. 
6 Id.; Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1115. 




11 Id.; see Appendix for a comparison of the two photographs. 
12 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1121. 
13 Id. 
14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 
2018) (No. 18-728). 
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the Ninth Circuit, the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits award 
copyright protection for a photographer’s “artistic judgment” in 
contributing “original elements” to a photograph.15  If the photographs 
were analyzed in one of these circuits by considering Rentmeester’s 
creative choices in the “selection and arrangement” of photographic 
elements, the court would most likely have found that the photographs 
are substantially similar.16  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, these circuits 
would also have found that the ballet-inspired pose is both original and 
protectable under copyright law. 
Although inconsistency among the circuits is not necessarily a 
negative feature in the law, this Note will argue that the Ninth Circuit 
misapplied the test for substantial similarity when examining the 
photographs, especially when it dismissed Rentmeester’s original and 
artistic judgments as unprotectable elements.  This decision should be 
viewed cautiously because the Ninth Circuit dismissed “various clearly 
creative and unique elements” that appeared in both photographs 
“based on minor differences.”17  As a result, this decision has the 
potential to “stifle creativity” because it will limit copyright protection 
 
15 Id. at 26. 
16 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 15; Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 14, at 26-27.  If the works were found to be substantially similar, Nike 
would not have a strong fair use defense.  The fair use doctrine is intended to promote the 
growth of copyright by allowing the limited use of the expression of another work in an 
author’s later work.  In determining whether there is copyright infringement, the courts will 
consider four factors for the fair use defense.  Specifically, the courts will evaluate “the 
purpose and character of the use,” “the nature of the copyrighted work,” “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” and “the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”  17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (2019).  Here, Nike’s fair use defense would fail because of “the amount and 
substantiality” factor.  Nike took the heart of Rentmeester’s work by posing Jordan in a similar 
ballet-inspired leap towards the basketball hoop.  Also, it copied several photographic 
elements in the Rentmeester photograph, including the pose, outdoors setting, and angle.  If 
Nike asserted a fair use defense, it would most likely fail based on this factor alone.  
Additionally, the first fair use factor does not weigh in favor of Nike because its photograph 
was not transformative.  To determine whether a new work is transformative, one must 
evaluate “whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or 
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message.”  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 579 (1994) (internal citations omitted).  According to the Supreme Court, “the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”  Id.  Nike’s photograph was not 
transformative because it did not provide any new meaning, purpose, or expression to 
Rentmeester’s photograph.  Instead, Nike’s photograph simply took various elements of 
Rentmeester’s photograph without adding any new value to the original photograph.  For an 
example of a photographic advertisement that was transformative, see infra note 150. 
17 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 15. 
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for a photographer who created an original work and produce 
confusion regarding the protections granted to photographers under 
copyright law.18  Consequently, although Rentmeester’s petition for 
certiorari was denied, the petition reflected the need for the Supreme 
Court to “set the law aright” to prevent a negative impact on 
creativity.19 
This Note will argue that the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the 
district court’s decision inappropriately analyzed the substantial 
similarity between the photographs because the court failed to consider 
the creative choices in Rentmeester’s overall “selection and 
arrangement” of photographic elements.20  Therefore, by essentially 
holding that copyright law offers limited protection for a 
photographer’s original and creative judgments in the selection and 
arrangement of a photograph, the Ninth Circuit’s test for substantial 
similarity may negatively impact the future of creativity in 
photography by limiting the scope of protection for photographs. 
Part II of this Note will explore the essential elements of a 
copyrightable work, which will help to lay a foundation in later 
sections for examining the scope of copyright protection in a 
photograph.  Specifically, this section will discuss fixation, originality, 
and creativity, along with their relationship to photographic works.  
Then, this section will examine the requirements for copyright 
infringement, the inverse-ratio rule, and the extrinsic and intrinsic tests 
for substantial similarity.  Part III will analyze the leading photography 
copyright infringement cases, focusing on a discussion of a 
photographer’s creative choices in the selection and arrangement of a 
photograph.  This section will also examine the photography cases 
decided in the circuits that disagree with the Ninth Circuit.  Part IV 
will discuss the background and procedural posture of Rentmeester, as 
well as the Ninth Circuit’s comparison of the two photographs and the 
dissenting opinion.  Part V will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s split from 
various circuits and the implications of this case on the future of 
creativity in photography.  This section will also propose a better 
approach for the Ninth Circuit’s review of future photography cases.  
Lastly, Part VI will conclude by summarizing the main points of 
Rentmeester and the impact of this decision on the creativity of 
photographers.   
 
18 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 24. 
19 Id. at 3. 
20 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 15.  
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II.  COPYRIGHT LAW AND PHOTOGRAPHIC WORKS 
Under the “Intellectual Property Clause” of the United States 
Constitution, the Framers encouraged the creation of works “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”21  This 
constitutional clause authorizes Congress “to enact both copyright and 
patent legislation.”22  As the production of such works was vital to the 
Founding Fathers for the success and development of the Nation, they 
expressly included an incentive to create these works in the 
Constitution.23  Under the Copyright Act of 1976, several requirements 
must be met to ensure the creation of copyrightable works.  The 
following subsection will examine these requirements and connect 
them to photographic works. 
A. Scope of Protection under the Copyright Act of 
1976 
1. Fixation 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection extends 
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”24  Specifically, “[a] work is ‘fixed’ . . . when its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the 
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”25  Unlike the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act secures 
protection for works at the start of fixation, “even if they were 
unpublished.”26  The 1976 Act enumerates eight categories of 
copyrightable works that are protected once they are fixed,27 including 
 
21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 1.02 (2019). 
22 NIMMER, supra note 21 (citation omitted). 
23 Gene Quinn, Patents, Copyrights and the Constitution, Perfect Together, IPWATCHDOG 
(Feb. 19, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/19/patents-copyrights-
constitution/id=93941/. 
24 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2019). 
25 Id. § 101.  Fixed works “can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated” in 
the following ways: “directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  Id. § 102(a).   
26 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 
2018, at 495 (2018).  For works analyzed under the 1909 Act, the work secures copyright 
protection when it is published.  Id. at 521. 
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (providing a list of the eight categories of copyrightable works). 
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“pictorial,  graphic, and sculptural works.”28  Additionally, “[t]he 1976 
Act expanded both the scope and duration of protection.”29  With The 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, the term for 
copyright protection extended to the author’s life plus 70 years.30   
Another important feature of fixation is that only a fixed work 
in a tangible form is considered a writing within the meaning of the 
United States Constitution.31  That is, under the “Intellectual Property 
Clause,” Congress has the explicit power to grant copyright protection 
for an author’s writing.32  Based on the language of that clause, 
Nimmer argues that the Constitution requires fixation of a work in 
some tangible form for protection under copyright law because only 
then will the work be considered a writing.33  As further discussed in 
Part III.A, the Supreme Court considers a photograph to be a writing 
consistent with the fixation requirement.34 
2. Originality and Creativity 
Next, the Constitution requires that the work is original.35  To 
satisfy the originality requirement, the copyright holder must 
“independently create[]” the work.36  Because originality is not 
equivalent to novelty, “a work may be original even though it closely 
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the 
result of copying.”37  The originality of a work also requires creativity; 
however, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low” and only 
“a slight amount will suffice.”38  While facts are not copyrightable 
because they “do not owe their origin to an act of authorship,”39 factual 
 
28 Id. § 102(a)(5).  “‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ include two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art 
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including 
architectural plans.”  Id. § 101. 
29 MENELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 495. 
30 Id. at 613-14. 
31 NIMMER, supra note 21, § 2.03[B]. 
32 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.   
33 NIMMER, supra note 21, § 2.03[B]. 
34 For an explanation of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of photographs and writings, 
see Part III.A. 
35 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).   
36 Id. at 345 (citation omitted).   
37 Id.  For example, if two poets wrote the exact same poem, the works will be original as 
long as the poets were not aware of the other’s poem.  Id. at 346.   
38 Id.   
39 Id. at 347.   
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compilations may be original if the author’s choices in the selection 
and arrangement of the facts are original.40  Similarly, an author’s 
originality is essential because there is no copyright protection for 
mere ideas or concepts.41  In fact, while “photographers cannot 
copyright their underlying subject matter . . . courts agree that the 
original judgments that photographers make in composing images are 
protectable.”42  Therefore, as long as the “photographer arranges or 
otherwise creates the subject that his camera captures,” the work may 
have the necessary originality to be protectable.43 
Over the years, the courts have articulated several protectable 
photographic elements that satisfy the required originality.44  For 
example, “[e]lements of originality in a photograph may include 
posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, 
evoking the desired expression, and almost any other variant 
involved.”45  These other variants may include clothing, accessories, 
and shade.46  Other elements include the type of lens, the exact timing 
of when to take the photograph, the area where the photograph is taken, 
and the subject matter for the photograph.47  One court even found 
protection in the photographer’s artistic choice in the “skin tone of the 
subject.”48  Protectable elements also include “the amount of the image 
in focus, its graininess, and the level of contrast.”49  While this list 
illustrates only some of the protectable photographic elements, it 
exemplifies the required degree of originality that a photographer must 
display when taking a photograph. 
 
40 Id. at 348   
41 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2019) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work.”). 
42 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 11.  “Any one may take a photograph of 
a public building and of the surrounding scene. It undoubtedly requires originality to determine 
just when to take the photograph, so as to bring out the proper setting for both animate and 
inanimate objects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade, position, etc.”  Pagano v. Chas. 
Beseler Co., 234 F. 963, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).   
43 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
44 Id. 
45 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).   
46 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884).  For a discussion of 
Burrow-Giles and its role in recognizing that photographs are protected under copyright law, 
see Part III.A. 
47 E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
48 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 1998). 
49 Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 450 n.37. 
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B. Elements of Copyright Infringement 
To succeed on a claim of copyright infringement, the copyright 
holder needs to establish “ownership of a valid copyright” and the 
“copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”50  To 
prove ownership of the copyright, the copyright holder must show that 
his work qualifies as one of the “original works of authorship” under 
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act as discussed in the previous 
section.51  The copyright holder can file suit for copyright infringement 
in this instance only after the work has been registered with the 
Copyright Office.52  Next, the second element requires “copying and 
unlawful appropriation.”53  First, the copyright holder has to establish 
that his work was copied “because independent creation is a complete 
defense to copyright infringement.”54  As long as the defendant created 
his work “without knowledge of or exposure to the plaintiff’s work,” 
there is no copyright infringement.55  However, when there is no 
evidence of direct copying, the copyright holder only needs to establish 
the defendant’s access to the work and that the “works share 
similarities probative of copying.”56  Typically, the inverse ratio rule 
is applied in cases assessing the similarity of two works when a 
plaintiff cannot directly prove that the defendant copied his work.57  
Under the inverse ratio rule, the courts “require a lower standard of 
proof on substantial similarity when a high degree of access is 
 
50 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).   
51 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2019).   
52 See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 888, 892 
(2019) (explaining that under the registration approach, a work is registered, and the copyright 
holder can file suit for copyright infringement, only after the Copyright Office examined the 
copyright application and registered the work). 
53 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
54 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1375 (2019).   
55 Id.; see Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be 
original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, 
not the result of copying.”). 
56 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117.  “To prove copying, the similarities between the two 
works need not be extensive, and they need not involve protected elements of the plaintiff’s 
work.”  Id.   
57 Id. at 1124.   
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shown.”58  Similarly, if two works have compelling similarities, a 
lessened degree of access is required.59   
Second, the copyright holder has to prove “unlawful 
appropriation,” or the illicit and unlawful copying of the work.60  To 
show unlawful appropriation, “the two works must be ‘substantial’ and 
they must involve protected elements of the plaintiff’s work.”61  For 
unlawful appropriation, the inverse ratio test is not applied because 
proof of access is not relevant.62  This part of the test only focuses on 
the “balance between the protection” provided to authors and the 
copying of too much protected expression.63  Thus, unlawful 
appropriation differs from the copying part of the test because proof of 
access does not have any bearing on unlawful appropriation.64  For 
photographs, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant “copied 
enough of the photo’s protected expression to render their works 
‘substantially similar.’”65  The following subsection will explain how 
the Ninth Circuit examines the substantial similarity of two works. 
C. Ninth Circuit Test for Substantial Similarity 
For substantial similarity, the Ninth Circuit uses a two-part test 
that includes “an objective extrinsic test and a subjective intrinsic 
test.”66  Under the extrinsic test, “analytic dissection and expert 
testimony are appropriate” in order to assess the specific objective 
criteria of the works.67  For photographs, the extrinsic test analyzes 
protectable elements, including the light, pose, angle, and type of 
lens.68  As part of the extrinsic test, the “court must filter out and 
 
58 Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 
1353, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1990)); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1172. 
59 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1124.   
60 Id. at 1117.   
61 Id. (citing Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
62 Id. at 1124-25. 
63 Id. at 1124 (citation omitted). 
64 Id. at 1124-25. 
65 Id. at 1118. 
66 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
67 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
68 See SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(“What makes plaintiff’s photographs original is the totality of the precise lighting selection, 
angle of the camera, lens and filter selection.”).  For a list of other original elements in a 
photograph, see supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
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disregard the non-protectible elements in making its substantial 
similarity determination.”69  Because the extrinsic test does not involve 
the trier of fact’s analysis of objective elements, the extrinsic test can 
be decided as a matter of law.70  However, as the dissenting opinion 
proposes in Rentmeester, the courts should consider whether it is 
appropriate to decide the substantial similarity of two works as a matter 
of law because this analysis is “inherently factual.”71  Next, under the 
subjective intrinsic test, the jury is presented with “whether the 
ordinary, reasonable person would find the total concept and feel of 
the works to be substantially similar.”72  Unlike the extrinsic test, the 
intrinsic test does not allow “analytic dissection and expert 
testimony.”73  While the circuits do not apply the exact test for 
substantial similarity, other circuits follow a test that is consistent with 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach.74  For example, the Eighth Circuit 
implemented the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test, and the Sixth Circuit 
and the D.C. Circuit follow an adapted version of the Ninth Circuit’s 
test.75        
III.  PHOTOGRAPHY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES 
To provide a proper analysis of the photographs in Rentmeester 
v. Nike, Inc., this Note will discuss relevant past photography cases.  
First, this section will examine Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony,76 one of the seminal photography cases, and it will evaluate its 
impact on subsequent photography infringement cases.  Second, this 
section will specifically examine photography cases from the First, 
Second, and Eleventh Circuits.  The application of copyright law in 
 
69 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). 
70 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
71 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1127 (Owens, J., dissenting) (9th Cir. 2018), 
cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 1375 (2019).  For an explanation of the dissenting opinion’s argument 
relating to copyright infringement cases decided as a matter of law, see infra notes 241-46. 
72 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pasillas 
v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
73 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.  For an explanation of the tests used in the Second Circuit, see 
infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
74 See generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 
(providing an extensive discussion of each circuit’s test for substantial similarity). 
75 Id. § 13.03[E][3][d] (comparing the Eighth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits with the Ninth 
Circuit’s test for substantial similarity). 
76 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
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these photography cases will serve as a direct comparison to the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis in a subsequent section of this Note.77 
A. Leading Photography Cases 
On March 3, 1865, Congress extended copyright protection to 
authors of photographs and photographic negatives.78  Through this 
amendment of the Copyright Act, Congress provided benefits to the 
authors of photographs “in the same manner, and to the same extent, 
and upon the same conditions as to the authors of prints and 
engravings.”79  Although Congress recognized the protection of 
photographs in 1865, the Supreme Court’s decision in the 1884 case 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony80 bolstered the recognition 
of photographs as protectable works.   
In Burrow-Giles, Napoleon Sarony, a photographer, 
photographed Oscar Wilde in New York.81  After Sarony took the 
“publicity photographs” for Wilde, he “registered his images with the 
Copyright Office.”82  Sarony commenced the lawsuit against Burrow-
Giles, a lithographic company, when it sold 85,000 copies of Sarony’s 
photograph, titled “Oscar Wilde, No. 18.”83  Burrow-Giles argued that 
“a photograph is not a writing nor the production of an author” because 
it is merely “a reproduction, on paper, of the exact features of some 
natural object, or of some person.”84  Unlike a painting or engraving, 
the company argued that a photograph is a “mere mechanical 
reproduction” of living or inanimate objects in nature, without any 
novelty or originality when it is reproduced in photographic form.85  
Contrary to Congress’s intent under the 1865 amendment to the 
Copyright Act, that argument suggested that protection for 
photographs went beyond the realm of “intellectual property rights 
permitted by the Constitution.”86 
 
77 For a discussion of the circuit split, see Part V. 
78  See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, §1, 13 Stat. 540, 540. 
79 Id. 
80 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
81 Id. at 54.   
82 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 8. 
83 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S at 54. 
84 Id. at 56. 
85 Id. at 59. 
86 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, 
Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-728).   
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However, the Court dismissed Burrow-Giles’ arguments for 
several reasons.  First, the Court explained that copyright protection is 
not confined to actual written works, but it includes all works “by 
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible 
expression.”87  Although the Constitution only expressly indicates that 
there is protection in an author’s writing, the Court explained that a 
writing is not limited to an author’s words.88  Instead, a writing is 
meant to encompass “the literary productions” of authors.89  In this 
way, photographs are similar to “maps, charts, designs, engravings, 
etchings, cuts, and other prints” as protected works under copyright 
law.90  Next, the Court found that Sarony’s photograph of Oscar Wilde 
possessed the required originality and “intellectual invention” to be 
protected under the Constitution.91  Specifically, the Court explained: 
[I]n regard to the photograph in question, that it is a 
‘useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful 
picture, and that plaintiff made the same . . . entirely 
from his own original mental conception, to which he 
gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in 
front of the camera, selecting and arranging the 
costume, draperies, and other various accessories in 
said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present 
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and 
shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, 
and from such disposition, arrangement, or 
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced 
the picture in suit.’92 
In Burrow-Giles, the Wilde photograph was protected under 
the Constitution because it embodied Sarony’s “original choices” and 
“artistic judgments.”93  For example, Sarony orchestrated the entire 
photograph by arranging and selecting various features, including the 
 
87 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.   
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 57. 
91 Id. at 60.  “We entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad enough to cover an act 
authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual 
conceptions of the author.”  Id. at 58. 
92 Id. at 60 (citation omitted). 
93 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 38. 
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costume, draperies, light, shade, Wilde’s pose, and other elements.94  
Under the Court’s analysis, “the same ‘intellectual innovation’ that 
entitles a photograph to protection in the first place also provides 
protection for the photograph’s expression of the original elements 
within it.”95  Burrow-Giles is one of the leading cases on photography 
copyright infringement because it holds that while the underlying 
subject of a photograph is not copyrightable, the photographer’s 
original and creative choices are protectable.96 
Subsequently, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,97 
the Court supported the protection for a photographer’s original 
choices.98  In this case, Bleistein sued the Donaldson Lithographing 
Company because that company copied three chromolithographs made 
for circus advertisements for a circus owned by Wallace.99  The Court 
found that pictures in the form of an advertisement are protected under 
copyright law because it “is none the less a picture, and none the less 
a subject of copyright.”100  Specifically, the Court recognized that each 
photographic element “is the personal reaction of an individual upon 
nature,” warranting copyright protection.101  Lastly, the Court 
cautioned that it is not the role of the courts to determine the artistic 
value of “pictorial illustrations.”102 
These two Supreme Court cases demonstrate the importance of 
a photographer’s originality in a photograph.  In Burrow-Giles, the 
Supreme Court explained that photographs are entitled to copyright 
protection as long as the photographer exhibited original and creative 
judgments.103  In this case, Sarony made several original and artistic 
choices while photographing Wilde that came from his own 
 
94 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55.  “Wilde’s image is not copyrightable; but to the extent a 
photograph reflects the photographer’s decisions regarding pose, positioning, background, 
lighting, shading, and the like, those elements can be said to ‘owe their origins’ to the 
photographer, making the photograph copyrightable, at least to that extent.”  Meshwerks, Inc. 
v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008). 
95 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 39. 
96 Id. at 11. 
97 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
98 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 11. 
99 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248. 
100 Id. at 251. 
101 Id. at 250. 
102 Id. at 251.  “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.”  Id. 
103 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).   
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“intellectual invention.”104  However, the Court implied that not every 
photograph is entitled to copyright protection, specifically 
photographic works lacking an author’s thought and originality.105  
Next, the Court in Bleistein further discussed the originality 
requirement by eliminating any distinction in copyright protection 
between an advertisement and “the fine arts.”106  That is, any 
photographic work capturing an author’s personality and originality 
will likely be copyrightable.107  Overall, Burrow-Giles and Bleistein 
serve as essential cases in the evaluation of copyright protection for 
photographic works. 
B. Circuit Court Cases 
In the cases discussed below from the First, Second, and 
Eleventh Circuits, the courts upheld the principle that copyright law 
protects a photographer’s original and creative choices.108  The 
analysis of these circuits will serve as a direct comparison to the Ninth 
Circuit’s application of copyright law in Rentmeester.  Then, in Part 
V, the protection granted for a photographer’s original choices in these 
circuits will be directly compared to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in 
Rentmeester. 
1. First Circuit 
In Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc.,109 the First 
Circuit’s decision hinged on a comparison between the protectable and 
unprotectable elements of a photograph.  In this case, Donald Harney, 
a freelancer, took a photograph “of a blond girl in a pink coat riding 
piggyback on her father’s shoulders as they emerged from a Palm 
Sunday service in the Beacon Hill section of Boston.”110  After 
discovering that the father in the photograph was a German citizen who 
 
104 Id. at 60. 
105 See id.  
106 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. 
107 Id. at 250.  “Personality always contains something unique.  It expresses its singularity 
even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is 
one man’s alone.  That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words 
of the act.”  Id. 
108 The Ninth Circuit supports the protection for photographs, but it misapplied the law by 
failing to find protection for individual photographic elements. 
109 704 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2013). 
110 Id. at 176. 
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abducted his daughter, the FBI used Harney’s photograph in a 
“Wanted” poster.111  Then, Sony made a televised movie about the 
events, depicting Harney’s photograph.112  Subsequently, Harney filed 
suit for copyright infringement against Warner Brothers for allegedly 
copying his photograph.113 
The First Circuit recognized several protectable elements in 
Harney’s photograph, including the framing of the father and daughter 
“against the background of the church and blue sky, with each holding 
a symbol of Palm Sunday” and “the bright colors alongside the 
prominent shadows.”114  However, none of these protectable elements 
were replicated in Warner Brothers’ photograph.115  Instead, the 
similarities between the photographs were based on unprotectable 
elements.116  For example, the court explained that “subject matter that 
the photographer did not create” is treated as mere unprotectable facts 
or ideas.117  In this case, while the two photographs seem similar, “that 
impression of similarity is due largely to the piggyback pose that was 
not Harney’s creation and is arguably so common that it would not be 
protected even if Harney had placed” the father and daughter.118  The 
court recognized that there may be protection for photographs taken of 
fleeting events “when the photographer does not simply take her 
subject ‘as is,’ but arranges or otherwise creates the content by, for 
example, posing her subjects or suggesting facial expressions.”119  
However, because Harney simply shot the father and daughter without 
making any choices in arranging them, the First Circuit held that 
Warner Brothers was not liable for copyright infringement.120 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, “the First Circuit takes a far broader 
view of photographers’ artistry than does the Ninth Circuit.”121  The 
difference between Harney’s photograph and Rentmeester’s 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id.  “Sony depicted the Photo in that movie using an image that was similar in pose and 
composition to Harney’s original, but different in a number of details.”  Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 186. 
115 Id.  In fact, “the two photographs are notably different in lighting and coloring, giving 
them aesthetically dissimilar impacts.”  Id. at 187. 
116 See id. at 186. 
117 Id at 181.  According to the First Circuit, subject matter that cannot be created by a 
photographer includes “a person, a building, [or] a landscape.”  Id. 
118 Id. at 186-87. 
119 Id. at 180-81. 
120 Id. at 182, 188. 
121 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 29. 
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photograph is that Harney spontaneously shot a photograph of the 
father and daughter, while Rentmeester purposefully staged and 
instructed Jordan’s position in his photograph.122  For a staged 
photograph like Rentmeester’s work, “copyright law requires a more 
dynamic measure of protection for originality”123 because the 
photographer’s original choices in arranging the subject of the 
photograph create “a protectible expressive work.”124  In contrast, 
Harney did not create the main subject of his photograph, thereby 
likening the subject to unprotectable facts.125  However, the First 
Circuit applied a broader application of protection for Harney’s 
photograph when it recognized his “artistic flair,” “artistry,” and 
“aesthetic judgments” in the photograph.126  For example, the court 
acknowledged his originality and creativity in the color tones and 
framing of the father and daughter in the photograph.127  Although 
Sony did not copy these original and protectable elements, the First 
Circuit respected the protection for Harney’s choices in his 
spontaneous photograph that produced “a distinctive, original 
image.”128  Compared to the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit did not 
provide the same protections for Rentmeester’s original choices in his 
staged photograph of Jordan.129   
2. Second Circuit 
Although the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit are the two 
principal appellate courts for deciding photograph infringement cases, 
the Second Circuit, like the First Circuit, conflicts with the Ninth 
Circuit’s narrow and limited application of copyright protection for 
photographs.130 
 
122 See id. at 28 (explaining that Harney’s photograph and Nike’s photograph required a 
different analysis of copyright protection). 
123 Id. 
124 Harney, 704 F.3d at 181. 
125 Id. at 184. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 186. 
128 Id. 
129 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 28 (“Further, even while ruling 
against Harney, the First Circuit displayed a considerably more robust vision of copyright 
protection for his spontaneous snapshot than the Ninth Circuit extended to the staged 
Rentmeester photo of Jordan.”).  For a discussion of Rentmeester’s original choices in his 
staged photograph of Jordan, see Part IV.A. 
130 Id. at 29. 
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In Rogers v. Koons,131 Jim Scanlon hired Art Rogers to 
photograph his eight German Shepherd puppies.132  Rogers exhibited 
“[s]ubstantial creative effort” while taking the photograph and while 
at his lab.133  For example, Rogers chose to photograph Scanlon and 
his wife with the eight puppies, and he made several selections in “the 
light, the location, the bench on which the Scanlons are seated and the 
arrangement of the small dogs.”134  Then, he “made creative judgments 
concerning technical matters with his camera and the use of natural 
light.”135  After preparing 50 images from the photography session, one 
photograph, later entitled “Puppies,” was selected for the Scanlons to 
purchase.136  Afterward, Rogers enjoyed success in this black and 
white photograph for other professional purposes.137 
Subsequently, after coming across “Puppies” on a notecard in 
a tourist store, Jeff Koons, an artist, and sculptor, decided to 
incorporate it in his upcoming sculpture exhibition show.138  Koons 
told his artisans “to copy” the photograph of “Puppies” for the 
sculpture.139  The colorized sculpture of “Puppies,” entitled “String of 
Puppies,” was featured at gallery exhibitions and on the cover page of 
a newspaper calendar.140  However, Rogers did not authorize Koons to 
use “Puppies” for his sculpture, resulting in Rogers’ suit for copyright 
infringement against Koons.141 
Here, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
that Koons infringed Rogers’ copyright in “Puppies.”142  Specifically, 
the Second Circuit agreed with the district court “that no reasonable 
juror could find that copying did not occur in this case.”143  Unlike 
most photograph infringement cases, this case was an outlier because 
there was direct evidence that Koons authorized the direct copying of 
 
131 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 






138 Id. at 305.   
139 Id.  In fact, “[i]n his ‘production notes’ Koons stressed that he wanted ‘Puppies’ copied 
faithfully in the sculpture.”  Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 306. 
143 Id. at 307. 
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“Puppies,” resulting in the grant of summary judgment for Rogers.144  
However, even in the absence of direct evidence, there would still be 
copyright infringement based on Koons’ access to “Puppies” and the 
substantial similarity between the two works.145   
Specifically, the Second Circuit explained that it is not the idea 
of eight puppies seated with the couple that is protected, but it is the 
photographer’s “expression of this idea.”146  For example, there is 
copyright protection “in the placement, in the particular light, and in 
the expressions of the subjects.”147  If Koons had created his own 
expression of the idea of these puppies rather than copying Rogers’ 
expression, then he may not have been subject to copyright 
infringement based on a lack of substantial similarity.148  However, 
while Koons added flowers to the couple’s hair and accentuated the 
puppies’ bulbous noses, “the overwhelming similarity to the protected 
expression of the original work” outweighed these minor differences 
for finding substantial similarity.149  Lastly, this case is particularly 
important because it highlights the protection in a photographer’s 
original choices.150  The court stated, “Rogers’ inventive efforts in 
 
144 Id. 
145 Id.  “Such similarity is determined by the ordinary observer test: the inquiry is ‘whether 
an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from 
the copyrighted work.’”  Id. (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d 
Cir. 1966)).  The Second Circuit also applies an abstraction test, which requires the court to 
break down the work into its structural elements and filter out the non-protectable elements.  
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992). 




150 For a discussion of original elements that are protected under copyright law, see supra 
notes 44-49.  In another Second Circuit case, the court found that while there is “no protection 
for the appearance in [the photographer’s] photograph of the body of a nude, pregnant female,” 
there is copyright protection in the photographer’s original and creative expression in 
photographing the woman’s body.  Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115-
16 (2d Cir. 1998).  Nevertheless, the court held that the fair use defense applied for Paramount.  
Id. at 110.  For an explanation of the four fair use elements, see supra note 16.  In Leibovitz, 
Paramount’s parodic advertisement of Leibovitz’s photograph was transformative.  137 F.3d 
at 114.  In particular, “the smirking face of Nielsen contrasts so strikingly with the serious 
expression on the face of Moore” that the advertisement appears to ridicule and comment on 
the original photograph.  Id.  Next, although the second factor favors Leibovitz because her 
“photograph exhibited significant creative expression,” this factor is not heavily weighted in 
considering fair use for parodic works.  Id. at 115.  While Paramount’s advertisement 
extensively copied several protectable elements, such as the lighting and camera angle, this 
third factor has minimal “weight against fair use so long as the first and fourth factors favor 
the parodist.”  Id. at 116.  Here, the fourth factor also favors Paramount because the parodic 
advertisement did not interfere with the market for Leibovitz’s work.  Id.  While fair use 
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posing the group for the photograph, taking the picture, and printing 
‘Puppies’ suffices to meet the original work of art criteria.”151  
Therefore, a photographer’s creative expression in the elements of a 
photograph “makes it original and copyrightable.”152 
3. Eleventh Circuit 
In Leigh v. Warner Brothers, Inc.,153 the Eleventh Circuit’s 
reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
defendant154 represents another important case that contrasts with the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Rentmeester.  In this case, Jack Leigh 
photographed “the Bird Girl statue in Savannah’s Bonaventure 
Cemetery that appears on the cover of the best-selling novel Midnight 
in the Garden of Good and Evil.”155  Leigh sued Warner Brothers, 
claiming that Warner Brothers infringed his photograph in the movie 
version of the novel and in promotional advertisements.156 
While the Eleventh Circuit rejected the claim of infringement 
for the film sequences, the court further analyzed Leigh’s photograph 
and the promotional photographs.157  The court explained that while 
there are identifiable differences between the two works, the Warner 
Brothers’ photographs are similar to many of the protectable elements 
of Leigh’s photograph.158  In Leigh’s photograph, the protectable 
elements include “the selection of lighting, shading, timing, angle, and 
 
applied, this case is important to show that the photographer was “entitled to protection for 
such artistic elements as the particular lighting, the resulting skin tone of the subject, and the 
camera angle that she selected.”  Id.  Therefore, this case supports the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Koons because it protects the photographer’s original choices and judgments. 
151 Koons, 960 F.2d at 307. 
152 Id. at 308.  In another photograph case involving Koons, the Second Circuit found that 
the fair use defense applied to Koons’ photograph because he took a reasonable amount of the 
plaintiff’s work and there was no negative effect on the market.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 
244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006). 
153 212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000). 
154 Id. at 1219. 
155 Id. at 1212. 
156 Id. at 1212-13. 
157 Id. at 1215-16.  For the film sequences, the court held that they “have nothing substantial 
in common with Leigh’s photograph except the statue itself.”  Id.  For instance, the film 
sequences were taken in a different part of the Bonaventure Cemetery from Leigh’s 
photograph, resulting in different “gravestones and greenery” shown in the works.  Id. at 1215. 
158 Id. at 1216.  Some differences are the appearance of the size of the statue, the lighting 
contrast, and specific additions in the Warner Brothers photographs, including “a green or 
orange tint” and “a Celtic cross and tree.”  Id. 
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film.”159  In particular, both “photographs are taken from a low 
position, angled up slightly at the Bird Girl.”  In addition, the tops of 
the photographs are bordered with Spanish moss, and the shining light 
“envelopes the statue.”160   
The Eleventh Circuit held that the lower court erred in deciding 
this case as a matter of law.161  Because “[c]opyright infringement is 
generally a question of fact for the jury to decide,” the court mistakenly 
held “that no reasonable jury” would find that the photographs were 
substantially similar. 162  Based on the similar photographic elements 
between the photographs, including the lighting, hanging Spanish 
moss, and positing of the camera angle, the court reasoned that these 
similarities were enough to prevent summary judgment.163  
Interestingly, even if a jury found that the protected photographic 
elements were not substantially similar, the court explained that the 
similarities were sufficient to at least avoid summary judgment.164  
Therefore, the Eleventh’s Circuit’s deference to the jury as the trier of 
fact is an essential part of the analysis that is missing in Rentmeester. 
IV. BACKGROUND OF RENTMEESTER V. NIKE, INC. 
A. Rentmeester and the Jordan Photograph 
Rentmeester is esteemed for creating “some of the most 
memorable images of the twentieth century.”165  His photographs were 
on the cover of at least sixty-seven magazines, and his photograph of 
an American tank commander in the Vietnam War is respected as the 
first time a color photograph won the World Press Photo of the Year 
award.166  Before becoming a photographer, he was an Olympic 
oarsman for the Netherlands.167  His athleticism influenced his 
photography because he became “well-known for photographing top 
athletes in original, surprising, and iconic ways.”168 
 
159 Id. at 1215 (emphasis added). 
160 Id. at 1216. 
161 Id. at 1213. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 1216. 
164 Id. 
165 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 13. 
166 Id. at 13, 15. 
167 Id. at 13. 
168 Id. at 15. 
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In 1984, Rentmeester created a photo collection of athletes 
competing in the Summer Olympics that year for Life Magazine.169  
The photograph of Jordan, who was a student at the University of 
North Carolina, was included in this collection.170  For several reasons, 
the photograph “is highly staged and manifests significant creativity 
and technical skill.”171  For example, Rentmeester wanted to take the 
photograph outside and away from the traditional basketball arena.172  
He further instructed his assistants to cut the grass very low in order to 
eliminate “visual distractions.”173  Also, he chose where he wanted to 
place the basketball pole and removed “any indication of basketball 
aside from a hoop, backboard, and pole.”174 
Next, Rentmeester was inspired to pose Jordan based on his 
experiences with taking photographs at the American Ballet Theatre.175  
Rentmeester envisioned that the ballet-inspired pose would appear to 
be “a gravity-defying dunk” to the viewer.176  Under Rentmeester’s 
direction, Jordan continuously practiced this unusual and artificial 
pose.177  Specifically, Rentmeester had Jordan “jump with his body 
open and facing the camera, his left leg forward, and his left hand 
extended while holding the perched basketball.”178  Interestingly, as 
Jordan typically dunks using his right hand, it “was a creative, non-
obvious decision” to arrange Jordan on the left side of the basketball 
hoop because it differs from the typical photos of Jordan dunking the 
basketball.179   
Additionally, Rentmeester made several creative and artistic 
judgments with his camera.180  For example, he used “a fast shutter 
speed synchronized with a powerful set of carefully-arranged outdoor 
strobe lights” in order to capture “a sharp silhouette of Jordan’s full 
figure against a contrasting solid background.”181  Also, Rentmeester 
 








177 Id. at 17. 
178 Id. at 16-17. 
179 Id. at 17-18. 
180 Id. at 17. 
181 Id. 
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perfectly timed pressing the shutter-release on his camera when Jordan 
was at the highest point of his leap.182  Lastly, Rentmeester made 
several choices with his lens in order to create “a deep depth of 
field.”183 
B. The Success of Rentmeester’s Photograph 
Remarkably, TIME Magazine recognized Rentmeester’s 
photograph as one of the most influential photographs in the world.184  
Initially, TIME wanted to assemble 100 of the most influential and 
powerful “images that changed the world.”185  Undoubtedly, this “was 
an exhaustive process,” and experts were essential for narrowing down 
the vast number of iconic photographs.186  In the end, 100 of the most 
influential images from 1826 to the present day were selected.187 
During this process, the authors of this project considered what 
makes a photograph influential.188  The authors stated, “[s]ome images 
are on our list because they were the first of their kind, others because 
they shaped the way we think.  And some made the cut because they 
directly changed the way we live.  What all 100 share is that they are 
turning points in our human experience.”189  For TIME, Rentmeester’s 
photograph deserved a spot on this list because it was perhaps “the 
most famous silhouette ever photographed.”190   
 
182 Id. 
183 Id.  “A photographer varies the depth of field by choosing the lens, varying the aperture 
size (the F-stop number), and varying the focal distance.  By employing an atypically deep 
depth of field, Rentmeester rendered all visual elements in focus, dramatizing Jordan’s dunk.”  
Id. 
184 The Most Influential Images of All Time, TIME 100PHOTOS, http://100photos.time.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
185 Id. 
186  About the Project, TIME 100PHOTOS, http://100photos.time.com/about (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019). 
187  The Most Influential Images of All Time, supra note 184.  For example, “Migrant 
Mother” by Dorothea Lange in 1936, “V-J Day in Times Square” by Alfred Eisenstaedt in 
1945, “The Pillow Fight” of the Beatles by Harry Benson in 1964, “A Man on the Moon” 
photograph of Neil Armstrong in 1969, and “Oscars Selfie” taken by Bradley Cooper and 
posted on Twitter by Ellen DeGeneres in 2014 are just five examples that are part of the 
collection of 100 of the most iconic photographs.  Id. 
188  About the Project, supra note 186. 
189 Id. 
190  Michael Jordan, TIME 100PHOTOS, http://100photos.time.com/photos/co-rentmeester-
michael-jordan (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
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C. Nike’s Photograph and Jumpman Logo 
Interestingly, TIME described Rentmeester’s “beautiful 
image” as “one unlikely to have endured had Nike not devised a logo 
for its young star that bore a striking resemblance to the photo.”191  
Around the time that Rentmeester’s photograph of Jordan was 
published, “Nike and Jordan entered into their well-known 
endorsement relationship.”192  Nike asked Rentmeester for color 
transparencies of his Jordan photograph for their marketing 
campaign.193  Rentmeester allowed Nike to use “two color 
transparencies for $150 under a limited license authorizing Nike to use 
the transparencies ‘for slide presentation only.’”194   
However, Nike violated the terms of the agreement when it 
“hired a photographer to produce its own photograph of Jordan, one 
obviously inspired by Rentmeester’s.”195  In Nike’s photograph, 
Jordan is also leaping towards the “basketball hoop with a basketball 
held in his left hand above his head, as though he is about to dunk the 
ball.”196  Also, both photographs have an outdoors setting and are taken 
from an angle looking up at Jordan.197  The differences appear to be 
the Chicago skyline in the background, the color of Jordan’s team on 
his clothing, and the Nike shoes.198  Nonetheless, Nike’s photograph 
was successfully displayed on posters and billboards.199  To avoid 
litigation after Rentmeester threatened to sue Nike, they entered into 
an agreement in which Nike paid $15,000 to use its photo on billboards 
and posters for two more years.200  However, Rentmeester claimed that 
Nike used the photograph beyond the two-year term.201  In fact, Nike’s 
“Jumpman” logo, which is “a solid black silhouette that tracks the 
outline of Jordan’s figure as it appears in the Nike photo,” has 
 
191 Id. 
192 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 18. 
193 Id. 
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produced “billions of dollars of merchandise.”202  With its famous logo 
and branding of sports celebrities, Nike further “created the concept of 
athletes as valuable commercial properties unto themselves.”203   
It is possible that Rentmeester’s photograph would not enjoy 
the same popularity today had it not been for Nike’s photograph and 
“Jumpman” logo.  In fact, TIME’s recognition of Rentmeester’s 
photograph as the initiation of the rise “of sports celebrity into a 
multibillion-dollar business” would most likely not have been possible 
without Nike.204  At the same time, Nike’s “Jumpman” logo and its 
promotional advertisements with its version of the Jordan photograph 
may not have been as successful without Rentmeester’s photograph.   
However, the continued success of each photograph has no bearing on 
the analysis of substantial similarity.  Instead, as the following part will 
examine, the Nike and Rentmeester photographs appear to be 
substantially similar despite the Ninth Circuit’s findings. 
D. The District Court’s Analysis 
In 2015, almost three decades after Nike took its photograph, 
Rentmeester filed suit for copyright infringement.205  Because 
“Rentmeester’s livelihood was commercial photography, and he did 
not want to put that at risk by filing a copyright lawsuit against one of 
the world’s most important advertisers,” he waited until his retirement 
to sue Nike.206  Thus, Rentmeester’s suit of copyright infringement 
only sought damages from “January 2012 to the present” if the court 
found infringement, the period within the three-year statute of 
limitations under the Copyright Act.207 
For several reasons, which are mostly endorsed by the Ninth 
Circuit, the district court granted Nike’s motion to dismiss the claim of 
copyright infringement.208  The district court explained “that very little 
 
202 Id. 
203  Michael Jordan, supra note 190. 
204 Id. 
205 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1116. 
206 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 20 n.1. 
207 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1116; see Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 
663, 671 (2014) (“Under the Act’s three-year provision, an infringement is actionable within 
three years, and only three years, of its occurrence.  And the infringer is insulated from 
liability for earlier infringements of the same work.”). 
208 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-00113-MO, 2015 WL 3766546, at *8 (D. Or. 
June 15, 2015). 
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of the selection and arrangement is original” because Rentmeester only 
captured the idea of Jordan leaping towards the basketball hoop in a 
grand-jeté pose.209  According to the court, “[t]he only arguably 
original” aspect of Rentmeester’s photograph is that it was shot outside 
rather than in a gym.210  However, the district court dismissed this 
original element as “not all that original” because basketball is played 
outdoors every day.211  For the district court, unlike the Ninth Circuit, 
Rentmeester’s photograph was only entitled to “thin protection” 
because there is a “narrow range of expression” to express the idea in 
the photograph.212  Next, the district court explained that while 
Rentmeester is entitled to protection for his expression of the ballet-
inspired pose, the two photographs have “several material differences” 
in the positioning of Jordan’s arms and legs.213  For the district court, 
this meant that the photographs were not substantially similar under a 
thin protection analysis because the photographs “are not virtually 
identical.”214  Lastly, the district court dismissed any substantial 
similarities after completing the filtering process of the photographs, 
explaining that “there are few if any similarities.”215 
E. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis in Rentmeester v. 
Nike, Inc. 
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
holding, finding that Rentmeester’s photograph and Nike’s photograph 
were not substantially similar as a matter of law.216  First, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that Rentmeester satisfied the first element for 
copyright infringement by showing that he has a valid copyright in his 
 
209 Id. at *6. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at *5; see Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1120 (“When only a narrow range of expression 
is possible, copyright protection is thin because the copyrighted work will contain few 
protectable features.”); see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 
2003) (explaining that despite the similarities between the photographs, a vodka bottle is only 
entitled to thin copyright protection because there are only a few creative ways to photograph 
the bottle).  For a discussion of broad copyright protection, see infra notes 232-33 and 
accompanying text. 
213 Rentmeester, 2015 WL 3766546, at *6. 
214 Id.  
215 Id. at *7. 
216 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1125. 
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photograph.217  For the second element, Rentmeester gave Nike the 
color transparencies of the Jordan photograph, establishing that 
“Nike’s access to Rentmeester’s photo, combined with the obvious 
conceptual similarities . . . is sufficient to create a presumption that the 
Nike photo was the product of copying rather than independent 
creation.”218  For the second part of the second element, Rentmeester 
had to show unlawful appropriation of his work, which requires an 
analysis of substantial similarity.219 
For substantial similarity, the Ninth Circuit explained that the 
protectable and unprotectable elements of a photograph are dissected 
and filtered differently from other works.220  In photographs, the 
objective elements221 are not protectable “when viewed in 
isolation.”222  As long as two photographs are not substantially similar, 
a photographer cannot prevent another photographer from using his 
“wholly original subject matter by having someone pose in an unusual 
or distinctive way.”223  The Ninth Circuit explained that Rentmeester 
cannot copyright Jordan’s pose and prevent another photographer from 
using that pose.224  Instead, he is only given protection for the way in 
which the pose is expressed through other objective elements, 
including “the camera angle, timing, and shutter speed.”225   
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit held that “copyright law does not 
protect the individual expressive elements in an image,”226 but only 
“the photographer’s selection and arrangement of the photo’s 
otherwise unprotected elements.”227  According to the court, these 
individual elements are the same as “unprotectable ‘facts’ that anyone 
may use to create new works.”228  In a factual compilation, the 
 
217 Id. at 1117-18 
218 Id. at 1118. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 1119. 
221 For a list of objective elements, see supra notes 44-49. 
222 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1119. 
223 Id. 
224 Id.  The Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit appear to agree that specific poses may not 
be copyrightable.  While a pose is not copyrightable, a photographer may be given copyright 
protection if such pose is arranged in a creative and original manner.  However, the Ninth 
Circuit strayed from the Second Circuit when it ignored the expressive and individual creative 
expressions in creating an original pose.  See discussion infra notes 254-57. 
225 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1119 
226 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 22. 
227 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1119. 
228 Id. at 1120. 
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underlying facts are not protectable and are free to be used by anyone 
in another work.229  However, if the facts are arranged and selected in 
an original manner, the work may be protected under copyright law.230  
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit views individual photographic elements as 
unprotectable and only the author’s original selection and arrangement 
of these elements are protectable.231 
Unlike the district court’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that 
Rentmeester’s photograph was entitled to broad protection.232  The 
court stated that “[t]he range of creative choices open to Rentmeester 
in producing his photo was exceptionally broad; very few of those 
choices were dictated by convention or subject matter.”233  However, 
the Ninth Circuit believed that the two photographs were only similar 
in their overall idea.234  These concepts include “Michael Jordan 
attempting to dunk in a pose inspired by ballet’s grand jeté,” the 
“outdoor setting stripped of most of the traditional trappings of 
basketball,” and “a camera angle that captures the subject silhouetted 
against the sky.”235  While the photographs share these similar features 
“at the conceptual level,” both photographs differ in their selection and 
arrangement of photographic elements.236  The Ninth Circuit held that 
the differences between the photographs included the position of 
Jordan’s limbs, the position of the hoops, the background, the setting, 
and the position of Jordan and the hoop within the frame.237  According 
to the court, unlike the hoop in Nike’s photograph, the hoop in 
Rentmeester’s photograph is beyond any person’s reach to dunk the 
basketball, creating a “whimsical rather than realistic nature of the 
depiction.”238  Also, in Nike’s photograph, Jordan is wearing Nike 
 
229 Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991)).  
230 Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-49). 
231 Id. at 1120. 
232 Id.; see Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If 
there’s a wide range of expression (for example, there are gazillions of ways to make an aliens-
attack movie), then copyright protection is ‘broad’ and a work will infringe if it’s ‘substantially 
similar’ to the copyrighted work.”). 
233 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1120. 
234 Id. at 1122-23. 
235 Id. at 1123.  In my opinion, the photographs are similar in their overall idea of Jordan in 
a ballet-inspired pose.  However, this general idea should not amount to substantial similarity.  
Instead, Nike’s photographer stole Rentmeester’s creative and artistic expression of this ballet-
inspired idea. 
236 Id. at 1122. 
237 Id. at 1121-22. 
238 Id. at 1122. 
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shoes and the colors of his basketball team, the Chicago Bulls.239  
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the works were not 
substantially similar as a matter of law.240 
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Owens agreed with the 
majority that there was no copyright infringement, but he disagreed 
with the court’s application of the law in coming to that conclusion.241  
He reasoned that “questions of substantial similarity are inherently 
factual, and should not have been made” on a motion to dismiss.242  In 
this case, both photographs show “Jordan doing a grand-jeté pose 
while  holding a basketball,” and the photographs “are taken from a 
similar angle, have a silhouette aspect of Jordan against a contrasting 
solid background, and contain an outdoor setting with no indication of 
basketball apart from an isolated hoop and backboard.”243  For Judge 
Owens, he was not certain “that no reasonable jury could find in favor 
of Rentmeester.”244  Unlike the majority, Judge Owens was hesitant to 
grant Nike’s motion as a matter of law.245  Consequently, Judge Owens 
concluded, “that whether the Nike photo is substantially similar is not 
an uncontested breakaway layup, and therefore dismissal of that 
copyright infringement claim is premature.”246   
If this case was not decided as a matter of law, it is possible 
that a jury would have found that the photographs were substantially 
similar.  In fact, William Patry warned against overstepping on the 
jury’s critical job in evaluating whether works are substantially 
similar.247  He stated, “the critical point is that reasonable minds 
looking at the two photos might disagree about whether there is 
infringement.  Judge Owens’ partial dissent by itself is evidence of 
this.”248  According to Patry, the Ninth Circuit ignored the subjectivity 
of copyright infringement suits.249  Specifically, the court erred in its 
method “where, if at least two appellate judges wouldn’t find 
infringement, the dispute can be decided at the pleading stage so long 
 
239 Id. at 1116. 
240 Id. at 1121. 
241 Id. at 1127 (Owens, J., dissenting). 
242 Id. (Owens, J., dissenting). 
243 Id. at 1127-28 (Owens, J., dissenting). 
244 Id. at 1128 (Owens, J., dissenting). 
245 Id. (Owens, J., dissenting). 
246 Id. at 1129 (Owens, J., dissenting). 
247 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:86.50 (Sept. ed. 2019). 
248  Id. 
249 Id. 
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as the two works are attached to the complaint.”250  Although it is 
unknown whether a jury would have found the two photographs to be 
substantially similar, the Ninth Circuit should have given a jury the 
opportunity to evaluate the two works. 
The subsequent section will illustrate the improper analysis of 
the Ninth Circuit and how the Second Circuit, similar to the First and 
Eleventh Circuits, would have decided this case.  Then, it will examine 
the implications of if the Supreme Court had reviewed this case or a 
similar case.  Lastly, it will discuss the potential negative implications 
of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis on creativity in photography.   
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RENTMEESTER V. NIKE, INC. ON 
CREATIVITY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC WORKS 
A. Circuit Split and the Ninth Circuit’s Major Errors 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision improperly applied the test for 
substantial similarity when analyzing the photographs, resulting in a 
split with the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits on the protection for 
photographs under copyright law.251  For the Ninth Circuit, 
photographic works are protected “in their selection and arrangement 
of unprotected facts,” thereby comparing a photograph to a 
phonebook.252  In comparison, several other circuits have consistently 
held that a photographer’s original photographic choices are protected 
under copyright law.253  The Ninth Circuit’s split from these circuits is 
not necessarily undesirable if the court accurately analyzed the law and 
protection for photographs.  However, for several reasons, the Ninth 
Circuit’s application of the test for substantial similarity was 
inaccurate and improperly conducted. 
First, the court ignored the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burrow-Giles, which recognized that “copyright law protects 
intentionally staged photographic subject matter.”254  In Burrow-Giles, 
the Court held that copyright law protects a photographer’s 
 
250 Id. 
251 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 24 (“In holding that the individual 
elements of a photograph are categorically unprotectable in copyright law, even when the 
photographer staged an original tableau, the Ninth Circuit split from the First, Second, and 
Eleventh Circuits, and brought its law into tension with the Third and Tenth Circuits.”).   
252 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 3. 
253 Id. at 26. 
254 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2. 
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“intellectual invention.”255  In that case, Sarony purposefully 
positioned Oscar Wilde, selected his clothing, and arranged the 
lighting to evoke a specific expression that he envisioned for the 
photograph.256  This recognition for the protection of originally staged 
photographs prevents other photographers from replicating the 
creative arrangement of the subject of the photograph.257   
An important caveat to the copyrightability of poses is that 
specific poses or mere ideas that are “found in the common domain are 
the inheritance of everyone” and are not protected under copyright 
law.258  However, it is the photographer’s creativity, originality, and 
expressive choices in posing and creating the subject of the photograph 
that will be protected.259  Professor Terry S. Kogan of S.J. Quinney 
College of Law stated, “[i]n instances in which the artist stages or 
poses the scene that she ultimately paints or photographs, those actions 
enhance the completed work’s originality because they evidence an 
additional input of personality into the work.”260  Thus, a 
photographer’s choices in posing the subject of the photograph elevate 
the degree of creativity of the photograph.261 
Since Burrow-Giles was decided in 1884, the courts have 
consistently recognized that “copyright protection extends to the 
staged subject matter of a photograph.”262  For instance, in Harney, the 
First Circuit explained that there is copyright protection when a 
photographer “arranges or otherwise creates the content by” posing the 
subject of the photograph.263  Although the court ruled against Harney 
because he did not create or pose the father and daughter, the First 
Circuit’s recognition of the protection for intentionally arranged 
 
255 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).  For a detailed 
discussion of Burrow-Giles, see supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text. 
256 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55.   
257 See NIMMER, supra note 21, § 2A.08[E][3][a][i] (2019) (“[W]hen the author of the 
photograph creates original subject matter (e.g., a sculpture, or distinctly posing individuals) 
that is then incorporated into the photograph, copyright protection for the photograph actually 
may—in principle—allow the photographer to prevent others from reproducing that subject 
matter.”); see also Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 6 
(“[T]his Court established that photographers who staged their subjects were authors of 
original works protected from copyright infringement.”).   
258 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).   
259 Id. 
260 Terry S. Kogan, The Enigma of Photography, Depiction, and Copyright Originality, 25 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869, 911 (2015). 
261 Id. at 876. 
262 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2. 
263 Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., 704 F.3d 173, 180 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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subjects in a photograph is consistent with Burrow-Giles.264  Similarly, 
the Second Circuit in Koons found that Rogers creatively arranged and 
posed the couple and their eight puppies.265  Although the idea of the 
puppies with the couple is not protected, Rogers’ creativity and 
original judgments in placing the puppies and the couple is protected 
under copyright law.266 
Unlike the First and Second Circuits and the Supreme Court in 
Burrow-Giles, the Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate “Rentmeester’s 
staged arrangement as a protected tableau.”267  For instance, 
“Rentmeester created many of his photo’s most original elements by 
directing and posing his subject, artificially manipulating the lighting 
and landscape, and employing a variety of skillful compositional 
techniques (bearing on the angle, lens, depth of field, and more).”268  
Specifically, Rentmeester instructed Jordan on the exact ballet-
inspired leaping pose that he wanted, and he positioned his camera at 
a precise angle to capture Jordan’s leaping pose.269  Rentmeester’s 
staged photograph, similar to the staged photographs in Burrow-Giles 
and Koons, should have been protected under copyright law.270  
However, the Ninth Circuit disregarded Rentmeester’s original and 
creative staging of Jordan and failed to recognize that Nike infringed 
Rentmeester’s photograph.271 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit “failed to extend adequate 
copyright protection to the camera-related choices that Rentmeester 
made prior to taking his picture.”272  For Rentmeester, these choices 
included “which camera, film, lenses, and filters to use; angle of shot; 
 
264 See id. at 182.  For an explanation of the First Circuit’s analysis of Harney’s photograph, 
see supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text. 
265  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).  
266 Id. at 308. 
267 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2.  Tableau is 
defined as “a representation of a picture, statue, scene, etc., by one or more persons suitably 
costumed and posed.”  Tableau, DICTIONARY.COM, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/tableau (last visited May 11, 2019). 
268 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 39. 
269 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1375 (2019). 
270 See Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 11 
(“Accordingly, Rentmeester’s tableau is protected by copyright and should be treated as the 
photographer’s singular subject matter.”). 
271 Id. at 8.  “[N]early every single element that Burrow-Giles (properly) identified as 
protectable would not be protected under the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.”  Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 14, at 39. 
272 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2. 
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aperture setting (f-stop); shutter speed; focus; ISO setting; use of 
special lighting and shading techniques; and timing of shot (e.g., time 
of day, atmospheric conditions, and moment at which to depress the 
shutter button).”273  Specifically, he “used powerful strobe lights and a 
fast shutter speed to capture a sharp image of Jordan contrasted against 
the sky.”274  Also, he shot the photo from an angle looking up at Jordan 
and “at the peak of his jump so that the viewer looks up at Jordan’s 
soaring figure silhouetted against a cloudless blue sky.”275  While the 
Ninth Circuit did concede that Jordan’s pose was “highly original,” it 
failed to consider Rentmeester’s original choices prior to 
photographing Jordan when it held that Nike only borrowed the idea 
of Rentmeester’s photograph.276  The court also likened these original 
photographic choices to unprotectable factual elements.277   As the 
Ninth Circuit interpreted individual photographic elements as 
unprotectable, the court only recognized copyright protection in the 
selection and arrangement of these elements.278  However, because the 
court only found similarities in the general idea,279 it explained that 
“Rentmeester cannot claim an exclusive right to ideas or concepts at 
that level of generality, even in combination.”280  The court concluded 
that Nike’s photographer made selections and arrangements that were 
“unmistakably different from Rentmeester’s photo,” resulting in no 
copyright infringement.281  In contrast, the Second Circuit in Koons 
recognized that there was originality and protection in the 
photographer’s choices, such as the posing, lighting, angle, camera, 
and film choice.282    
Further, the Ninth Circuit erred when it ignored the protection 
for Rentmeester’s individual photographic elements.283  For example, 
 
273 Id. 
274 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1115-16. 
275 Id. at 1115. 
276 Id. at 1121. 
277 Id. at 1120 (according to the Ninth Circuit, the individual elements of a photograph are 
unprotectable facts that can be used by any photographer to create a new photograph). 
278 Id. at 1122. 
279 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
280 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d.at 1123.   
281 Id. at 1122.  For the Ninth Circuit’s list of the differences between the photographs, see 
supra notes 236-39. 
282 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).   
283 See Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 19 (“Camera-
related choices are individual artistic expressions, akin to a painter’s mixing his paint, 
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in Leigh, the Eleventh Circuit held that there was copyright protection 
in the individual elements in Leigh’s photograph, specifically “the 
selection of lighting, shading, timing, angle, and film.”284  Unlike the 
Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit did not treat these elements “as 
unprotectable facts arranged creatively.”285  That court’s decision, 
unlike the Ninth Circuit’s decision, is supported by copyright law in 
its recognition that an author’s expressive originality and creativity are 
protectable.286  In this case, the Ninth Circuit improperly likened 
photographic elements to unprotectable facts because it failed to 
recognize that “Mr. Rentmeester did not ‘select’ Mr. Jordan’s pose, in 
the same manner as would a compiler of phone numbers select what 
numbers to include in a phone book.  The artist here created Mr. 
Jordan’s pose, and he created the tangible expression of that pose in 
the photograph.”287  In fact, Rentmeester did not arrange “a pile of 
preexisting, unchanged facts,” but he created “highly-original, 
carefully-staged elements.”288  Thus, the Ninth Circuit improperly 
overlooked the creative and expressive elements that are protected 
under copyright law. 
Next, while the Ninth Circuit correctly decided that 
Rentmeester’s photograph was subject to broad copyright 
protection,289 it failed to apply broad protection to the photograph.  
Instead, because the court examined the individual photographic 
elements as unprotectable facts, the court treated the photograph “as 
though it were entitled to only the thin protection afforded databases, 
phonebooks, and other factual compilations.”290  As a result, the Ninth 
Circuit required that there be “near-virtual identity” between the 
 
choosing a brush, or choosing a brushstroke technique. If a pirating photographer imitates 
those choices in enough detail, he will infringe the original.”). 
284 Leigh v. Warner Brothers, Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000). 
285 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 36. 
286 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2019) (stating that there is protection “in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”). 
287 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 13-14.  Here, the pose 
should be protectable because Rentmeester originally and creatively posed Jordan. 
288 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 39. 
289 See Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 2 (“Because 
Rentmeester both staged the tableau for his photograph and made highly original camera-
related choices in taking his picture, that image is entitled to the broadest copyright 
protection.”).  For a discussion of broad copyrights, see supra notes 232-33 and accompanying 
text. 
290 Id. at 3; see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(“explaining that factual compilations are subjection to thin copyright protection). 
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photographs in order to find copyright infringement.291  Professor 
Terry S. Kogan explained when photographic works should be subject 
to thin copyright protection.292  He stated, “[i]f the camera-related 
choices and actions that a photographer utilizes in snapping a picture 
have been largely dictated by previous creative choices and actions of 
others or by industry conventions, then the photographer’s resulting 
image is entitled only to thin copyright protection against slavish 
replication.”293  Based on Professor Kogan’s analysis of thin copyright 
protection, the Ninth Circuit misused a thin protection analysis for 
Rentmeester’s photograph because Rentmeester originally and 
expressively created the photograph of Jordan.294  Instead, for the test 
for substantial similarity, the court required “a near-slavish copy” of 
Rentmeester’s photograph in order to find that Nike was liable for 
copyright infringement.295   
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of Rentmeester’s 
idea is problematic.296  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the overall 
idea of Rentmeester’s photograph was to show Jordan “holding a 
basketball above his head in his left hand with his legs extended, in a 
pose at least loosely based on the grand jeté.”297  With this very 
specific characterization of the idea that included expressive elements, 
the court ignored Rentmeester’s highly original and creative choices 
as protected expression.298  The court further muddied the distinction 
between general ideas and expression when it likened the untraditional 
outdoor setting and camera angle showing “the subject silhouetted 
against the sky” as mere ideas.299  By eliminating these highly 
 
291 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 
2018) (No. 18-728). 
292 Terry S. Kogan, How Photographs Infringe, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 353, 360 
(2017). 
293 Id. at 361. 
294 See Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 21 (“Despite 
the Ninth Circuit’s consistent praise of the originality of his photograph, its analogizing 
Rentmeester’s photograph to a factual compilation effectively relegates the work to the 
thinnest realm of copyright protection.”). 
295 See id. 
296 See Lee Burgunder, The Changing Landscape of Copyrights: Hope Shifts from 
Photographers to Users, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/10/15/changing-landscape-copyrights-hope-shifts-
photographers-users/id=114535/. 
297 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1375 (2019). 
298 See Burgunder, supra note 296. 
299 Id.; Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1123. 
34
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/4
2020 THE “FOUL” PROTECTION 1161 
expressive similarities from the evaluation of substantial similarity, the 
court only considered “secondary details,” such as the position of 
Jordan’s legs, as protected and expressive elements.300  As a result, the 
court bypassed the major expressive similarities between the 
photographs, making it easy to find differences between these 
“secondary details.”301 
Another concern is that the court did not provide any guidance 
on how it distinguished the general idea from Rentmeester’s 
expressive choices.302  Instead, the court only stated the idea “as if it 
had to be true.”303  If the Ninth Circuit had defined the idea in a 
different way, it is possible that his artistic choices would have been 
considered expressive and protectable.304  For example, Rentmeester’s 
idea may have been to simply capture Jordan playing basketball, or he 
may have wanted to show Jordan leaping with a ballet-esque pose 
towards the basketball hoop.305  Other possible characterizations of the 
idea include capturing Jordan leap in the air while trying to dunk the 
basketball, showing Jordan leap towards the hoop “with a dance 
move,” or highlighting Jordan’s leap towards the hoop “with an 
unusual posture.”306  Any of these characterizations would have likely 
given Rentmeester the protection and artistic credit for his original and 
expressive choices.307  However, the Ninth Circuit chose to blend 
Rentmeester’s expressive choices as part of the general idea, making 
it difficult for Rentmeester to be given the appropriate protection for 
his work.308 
Next, the Ninth Circuit correctly acknowledged that if the Nike 
photograph replicated and exactly copied Rentmeester’s “highly 
original” pose, a jury might have found that Nike was liable for 
copyright infringement.309  The Ninth Circuit is also correct in stating 
that Rentmeester cannot prevent other photographers from 
 
300 Burgunder, supra note 296.  Other details considered were “the skyline, the sun, lighting 
and shadows, and Jordan’s position in the photo.”  Id. 
301 Burgunder, supra note 296; see Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 
1, at 17 (“The tangible expression of the idea by Mr. Rentmeester is exactly what was stolen.”). 





307 Id.   
308 See id. 
309 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1375 (2019). 
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photographing the idea of Jordan in a ballet-inspired pose.310  The 
crucial aspect of this case is that Rentmeester was not attempting to 
gain copyright protection for his ballet-inspired pose; instead, he 
argued for copyright protection in the original and unique choices that 
he made when photographing Jordan.311  However, the essential 
problem is that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider that “the minor 
differences between Rentmeester’s and Nike’s photographs do not 
undermine the fact that Nike copied the critical features of 
Rentmeester’s staged tableau.”312 
An evaluation of how the Ninth Circuit would have decided 
Burrow-Giles will demonstrate the court’s flawed interpretation of the 
protection for photographic works.  In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme 
Court held that Sarony’s photograph of Wilde was entitled to copyright 
protection because he arranged an original and creative work.313  In 
several ways, Sarony’s and Rentmeester’s photographs were similar 
because both photographers creatively and thoughtfully orchestrated 
the pose, the subject of the photograph, the perspective, the 
background, the lighting, and other elements.  Unlike the Supreme 
Court’s determination that Sarony was entitled to protection for these 
original photographic choices, the Ninth Circuit dismissed similar 
original artistic judgments in “Rentmeester’s meticulously staged 
tableau” as unprotectable.314  Thus, if the Ninth Circuit had decided the 
Burrow-Giles case, it is likely that it would have denied Sarony 
copyright protection for his original work.   
The Second Circuit’s analysis of photographic works is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Burrow-Giles.  If 
this case had been decided in the Second Circuit, it is possible that 
Rentmeester would have been granted protection for his work.  In 
particular, just as Rogers was granted copyright protection for his 
original arrangement and pose of the puppies and the couple, 
Rentmeester would be granted protection for his inventive positioning 
 
310 Id. 
311 Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 13.  In reality, 
not all ballet-inspired poses are as inventive and original as Rentmeester’s pose. 
312 Id. at 18. 
313 For a discussion of this case, see Part III.A.  Similar to Rentmeester’s photograph of 
Jordan, “Sarony was not claiming an exclusive right to photograph Oscar Wilde.”  Brief of 
Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae, supra note 86, at 13.   
314 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(No. 18-728). 
36
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/4
2020 THE “FOUL” PROTECTION 1163 
of Jordan.315  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit would most 
likely hold that Rentmeester’s original artistic judgments are 
protectable because he uniquely staged his photograph.316 
The mere fact that the Ninth Circuit split from the other circuits 
is not the reason for disagreement with its decision.  A major problem 
with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Rentmeester is that it fails to 
provide the necessary protection for photographs.  Instead, the Second 
Circuit’s protection for photographs aligns more closely with the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation in Burrow-Giles.  Based on the reasons 
set forth in this section, the Ninth Circuit inappropriately and 
inaccurately analyzed these photographs under copyright law.  
Specifically, the court failed to appreciate that Rentmeester carefully, 
meticulously, and thoughtfully chose each individual element of his 
photograph in an artistic manner.  In the next section, this Note will 
describe how the Ninth Circuit’s decision will impact photographic 
creativity. 
B. Creativity and Photography 
Aside from the Ninth Circuit’s improper application of the law, 
its decision also has negative implications on the future of creativity in 
photography.  Unlike other forms of art, such as music and paintings, 
photography is a recent art form, resulting in photography often being 
viewed as an “inferior art.”317  Specifically, photography was 
perceived as having an inferior status largely because of “its 
mechanical nature and depiction of external reality.”318  Because 
photographs can be quickly taken due to advancements in technology, 
there is a misconception that taking a photograph “requires little 
effort.”319  In reality, many photographers, like Rentmeester, create 
their photographs from “a product of extensive skill, experience, and 
creative talent.”320  Despite these common misconceptions, 
 
315 For a discussion of these cases, see Part III.B.2. and Part IV. 
316 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 314, at 9 (“The First and Second Circuits hold 
that an original tableau staged by a photographer and expressed in a photograph is 
protectable.”). 
317 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 10. 
318 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 11. 
319 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 4. 
320 Id. 
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photographs have generally received the necessary recognition as a 
protected work under copyright law.321 
However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision inevitably bolstered the 
initial view that photographs are an inferior work of art.322  By likening 
the photographic elements in Rentmeester’s photograph to factual 
elements, the Ninth Circuit stripped Rentmeester of his creative and 
artistic judgments.323  This decision wrongly implies “that the 
individual elements in a photograph are divorced from the creativity of 
the photographer.”324  As the following hypothetical will examine, 
each photographer’s artistic and creative choices in a photograph 
should be protected. 
In this hypothetical, consider a scenario in which Nike’s 
photograph was simply inspired by Rentmeester’s photograph and 
only captured the idea of Jordan in a ballet-inspired pose.325  In this 
hypothetical photograph, Jordan is not leaping in a ballet-inspired pose 
towards the basketball hoop.  Instead, Jordan is in a relevé326 ballet 
position with his hands extended above his head.  Unlike 
Rentmeester’s photograph, Jordan is not dunking the basketball, but he 
has the basketball grasped between his upraised hands.  Also, the 
photograph is shot at an angle looking down at Jordan’s face, revealing 
his concentration and determination.  The photographer instructed 
Jordan that he wanted to highlight his facial expressions.  Similar to 
the Rentmeester photograph, the hypothetical photograph is taken 
outdoors, but this photograph is taken on a busy New York City 
sidewalk against a beautiful sunrise.  Lastly, Jordan is wearing Nike 
apparel in this photograph, not a traditional basketball uniform. 
Unlike the actual Nike photograph, this Nike photograph is not 
substantially similar to Rentmeester’s photograph because it only 
copied the idea of Jordan’s playing basketball in a ballet pose.  While 
 
321 Id. at 11. 
322 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 314, at 11 (“This decision thus gives renewed 
life to a centuries-old view of photography as an inferior art—a misperception that this Court 
rightly rejected in Burrow-Giles, and that the Court is once again called upon to repudiate 
here.”). 
323 See Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 12 (“It equates a phone 
book—a functional tool that merely arranges pre-existing and unchanged phone numbers—
with a work of art in which the artist has carefully created each foundational element.”). 
324 Id. 
325 For this hypothetical photograph, only a few photographic elements are considered, 
including the pose, camera angle, and the background setting.  The purpose of this hypothetical 
is to distinguish between inspiration and infringement of another photographer’s work. 
326 In this ballet pose, the ballet dancer will have his or her feet together in a raised position. 
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there are similarities between the photographs, such as the outdoor 
setting, the hypothetical photograph does not copy any specific 
elements.  Instead, the photographs are different in their camera angle, 
pose, setting, and other elements.  Although some elements are quite 
similar, there are no indications of copying.  For example, while 
Rentmeester’s photograph is taken against a cloudless sky, this Nike 
photograph is shot against a beautiful sunrise, revealing clear 
differences in the background.   
This hypothetical photograph is intended to show that 
photographers can be inspired by another photographer when taking a 
photograph.  However, the resulting photograph must represent the 
photographer’s own expression, creativity, and originality to prevent 
copying and infringement.  In Rentmeester, Nike’s photographer was 
allowed to build on the idea of a ballet-inspired pose, but he improperly 
stole Rentmeester’s creative and artistic expression.  This decision 
conflicts with the Framers’ intent to promote the creation of creative 
works.327  Further, this decision will strip photographers “of their 
ability to protect the creative expression of their work from anything 
other than wholesale lifting.”328 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision may stifle creativity because 
photographers will be cautious about creating works that could be 
easily copied.  In their amici curiae brief, The American Society of 
Media Photographers, Inc. and The National Press Photographers 
Association argued: 
One can imagine that if Mr. Rentmeester was faced 
with the knowledge that he would not be able to protect 
and profit from his creative work, he would not have 
created the image in the first place. The world would 
have been deprived of an iconic image that has 
animated the minds and souls of millions of people 
across the globe. . . . The public good, in a very literal 
sense, would have been less robust, less fulfilled, and 
weakened. It is inconsistent with copyright law and the 
constitutional purpose of the Copyright Act that Nike 
should reap such an enormous benefit from a creative 
work, without permission, and the creator should be left 
 
327 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
328 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 5. 
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with a right without a remedy. Creations such as Mr. 
Rentmeester’s must continue to be protected.329 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision may halt photographers from 
producing and creating works in anticipation of other photographers 
stealing their creative and artistic judgments.  If this case had adopted 
the Second Circuit’s approach, photographers would be rewarded for 
their originality and creativity rather than being punished and 
demeaned.330  As the next section will discuss, the Supreme Court 
should have reviewed this case to protect each photographer’s creative 
expression. 
C. The Supreme Court Should Have Reviewed This 
Case 
On March 25, 2019, the Supreme Court denied Rentmeester’s 
petition for certiorari.331  For several reasons, the Court should have 
granted this petition in order to prevent the stifling of photographic 
creativity and to resolve the circuit split. 
First, the Supreme Court’s review of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision could have ensured the continuation of photographic 
creativity and photography’s place as an art form.332  In general, while 
a photographer can draw inspiration from another photographer’s work 
under copyright law, protection is “needed from wholesale duplication 
of the expression of their inspiration.”333  In this case, Nike was entitled 
to draw inspiration from Rentmeester’s photograph, but it was 
prohibited from taking Rentmeester’s original expression and creative 
arrangements.  However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision ultimately stands 
for the proposition that Nike could do just that.334  In addition, the 
Ninth Circuit “treats photography as a second-class art and denigrates 
 
329 Id. at 7. 
330 See id. at 9 (“If the goals of the courts and legislatures that have recognized the 
importance of copyright protection are to be upheld at all, these decisions that target and 
demean both photographers and photography as an art and [sic] must be reversed.”). 
331 Rentmeester v. Nike Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/rentmeester-v-nike-inc/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
332 See Part V.B. for a discussion of the potential stifling of creativity. 
333 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 4. 
334 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 40 (“The Rentmeester photo is an 
original work of art that expresses Michael Jordan’s elegance and athletic ability. . . [the] 
expressive elements were meticulously created by Rentmeester, and then meticulously pirated 
by Nike.”). 
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photographers’ artistic judgments.” 335  As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision may reinforce the idea that photographs are mere factual 
works, stripping away the protections that should rightfully be given 
to photographers for their expressive photographic choices. 
Second, a review of this case would have settled the circuit split 
on this issue, allowing photographers to be certain of the protections 
that they will be granted for their photographs.  In Rentmeester’s 
petition for certiorari, he persuasively argued that this case serves as 
“an excellent vehicle” to evaluate the differing interpretations of 
copyright law among the circuits.336  In particular, while the Supreme 
Court’s review of this case could have corrected the Ninth Circuit’s 
flawed analysis, “the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous rule of law will stand 
as an obstacle to uniform application of the Copyright Act” because 
the decision “will sow confusion, reward piracy, and stifle 
creativity.”337  On the other hand, even if the Supreme Court had 
reviewed this case and agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision, a 
review of this case would have at least provided photographers with 
clear guidance on how the courts will examine future cases with similar 
issues.338  Ideally, a review of this case would have been essential to 
provide clarity among the circuits on copyright protection for 
photographs.   
In the future, the Supreme Court should correct the Ninth 
Circuit’s flawed application of copyright law to prevent this 
uncertainty in the law.  However, absent a Supreme Court decision, the 
courts interpreting the Ninth Circuit’s decision should reconsider its 
approach in future photography infringement cases.  The next section 
will provide a proposed approach for the Ninth Circuit, along with any 
other circuits that may share or adopt its view, in future cases.    
D. Proposed Approach for Photography Cases in the 
Ninth Circuit 
The decision in Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc. demonstrates that the 
Ninth Circuit should reevaluate its approach to the scope of copyright 
 
335 Id. at 3. 
336 Id. at 38. 
337 Id. 
338 Brief for Am. Soc’y of Media Photographers, supra note 1, at 4 (“Leaving this area of 
law jumbled and confused with conflicting opinions would chill the creation of new works 
and give the green light to infringers the world over.  These creators need clarity.”). 
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protection for photographs.  By comparing individual photographic 
elements to factual works, the Ninth Circuit stripped photographs of 
their artistic and creative nature as a protected art form.  The court 
should consider its decision with the case law from the Supreme Court 
and the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits to reevaluate the 
protection that it should have given to Rentmeester’s photograph. 
In future photography cases, the Ninth Circuit should clearly 
distinguish between individual unprotectable facts in a factual work 
and individual protectable photographic elements.  Specifically, if the 
Ninth Circuit were to receive a photography case requiring the jury to 
review the substantial similarity between two photographs, the court 
should clearly distinguish between unprotectable facts and protectable 
photographic elements.  This instruction to the jury would require the 
Ninth Circuit to accept that photographers can make creative and 
original arrangements and expressive choices that are protectable.  The 
jury would also need to be instructed that mere ideas and concepts are 
not protectable, but it is the author’s expression of that idea that is 
protected.  For example, if a court in the Ninth Circuit were to instruct 
a jury based on this case, it would tell the jury that the idea of shooting 
a basketball in a ballet-inspired pose is not protectable.  However, the 
court would tell the jury that Rentmeester’s original and creative 
expression of that idea, namely the pose, lighting, angle, and camera 
speed, are protected.  This case should have had a different result if the 
jury heard this case with these instructions.   
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit should reexamine its application 
of copyright law compared to the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits.  
These circuits closely align with the Supreme Court’s precedent in 
Burrow-Giles, recognizing that there is copyright protection for a 
photographer’s original and creative choices.  Likewise, the Eleventh 
Circuit, for example, demonstrated the importance of deferring to the 
jury in deciding whether two works are substantially similar.  Given 
the similarities between Nike’s photograph and Rentmeester’s 
photograph,339 along with Rentmeester’s highly original and inventive 
creation, the jury should have been given the opportunity to hear this 
case.  Overall, the Ninth Circuit should consider aligning with the First, 
Second, and Eleventh Circuits because the approach of these circuits 
provides a fairer and more consistent application of copyright law.   
 
339 For a discussion of the similarities between the photographs, see supra notes 197, 243. 
42
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/4
2020 THE “FOUL” PROTECTION 1169 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc. has 
serious implications for the future of photographic creativity and the 
protections given to photographs under copyright law.  In deciding that 
the photographs were not similar as a matter of law, the court denied 
Rentmeester the opportunity of presenting the factual issues in his case 
to a jury.  Further, in choosing not to review Rentmeester’s case, the 
Supreme Court left the protection for photographs unsettled.  This will 
most likely result in more photographers copying other photographers’ 
creative expression without being held liable for infringement.  The 
Ninth Circuit should correct this misapplication of the law and align 
with the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits by giving protection to 
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Note: This photographic comparison of Rentmeester’s 
photograph and Nike’s photograph is found in the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision.  
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